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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Scott Douglas Allred appeals from the order revoking his probation and 
imposing a reduced sentence for felony DUI. 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
The state charged Allred with felony DUI and driving without privileges. 
(R., pp. 22-23.) He entered a guilty plea to the felony DUI charge in which the 
parties agreed to recommend a suspended sentence of ten years with two years 
fixed and probation. (R., pp. 24-25.) The district court entered judgment on 
January 12, 2009, sentencing Allred to ten years with four years fixed and 
retaining jurisdiction. (R., pp. 30-32.) On June 11, 2009, the district court 
suspended Allred's sentence and placed him on probation for six years. (R., pp. 
39-44.) 
A little less than two years later the state moved for a warrant for probation 
violations. (R., pp. 47-49.) Several months later Allred admitted violating his 
probation by consuming alcohol, being at places where alcohol is served, 
changing residences without permission, and failing to pay fees and costs. (R., 
pp. 47-48, 62.) The district court revoked Allred's probation and executed a 
reduced sentence of ten years with three and one-half years fixed on February 
12, 2012. (R., pp. 64-66.) Allred filed a timely notice of appeal from the order 
revoking his probation and executing his sentence. (R., pp. 88-90.) 
In his notice of appeal Allred specifically requested transcripts of the 
February 2, 2012 "Sentencing Hearing" and the December 8, 2011 "AdmiUDeny 
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Hearing," the most recent hearings before the appeal was filed. (R., p. 89.) Both 
these transcripts were provided. (R., pp. 92-93; see also 12/8/11 Tr.; 2/2/12 Tr.) 
The Court reporter also lodged two additional transcripts-of the guilty plea 
hearing in 2008 and the sentencing on January 8, 2009-as the "standard 
transcript" requested by Allred. (R., pp. 89, 94; see also 1/8/09 Tr.; 11/13/08 Tr.) 
Allred moved to augment the record with a transcript of the "rider review 
hearing, held on June 19, 2009." (Motion to Augment, p. 1.) The Idaho Supreme 




Allred states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. 
Allred's probation and executed his underlying sentence of 
ten years, with four [sic] fixed and by not further reducing Mr. 
Allred's sentence upon revocation of probation? 
2. Was Mr. Allred denied due process and equal protection 
when the Idaho Supreme Court denied his requests to 
augment the record on appeal with a necessary transcript? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 6.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Allred failed to show an abuse of discretion in the district court's order 
revoking Allred's probation and executing a sentence of ten years with 
three and one-half years fixed for felony DUI? 
2. Has Allred failed to show he was entitled to a transcript of the "rider 
review" hearing held in June 2009 in order to challenge the revocation of 




Allred Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The District Court's Order Revoking 
Probation And Executing A Sentence Of Ten Years With Three And One-Half 
Years Fixed For Felony DUI 
A Introduction 
Upon Allred's admission to multiple probation violations, the district court 
revoked Allred's probation, reduced Allred's sentence for felony DUI to ten years 
with three and one-half years fixed, and ordered the sentence executed. (R., pp. 
64-66.) On appeal Allred claims the district court abused its discretion in two 
ways: first, by revoking probation and second, by not further reducing his 
sentence despite the violations. (Appellant's brief, pp. 7-14.) Application of the 
relevant legal standards to the facts shown by the record shows no abuse of 
discretion. 
B. Standard Of Review 
"A decision to revoke probation will be disturbed on appeal only upon a 
showing that the trial court abused its discretion." State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 
618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 839 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing State v. Beckett, 122 Idaho 
324, 326, 834 P.2d 326, 328 (Ct. App. 1992)). 
C. Allred Has Failed To Show Any Abuse Of Discretion 
"It is within the trial court's discretion to revoke probation if any of the 
terms and conditions of the probation have been violated." State v. Morgan, 153 
Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 839 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing I.C. § 19-2603) .. The 
trial court should examine whether probation is accomplishing its two-fold 
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mission of rehabilitation and protection of society. Morgan, 153 Idaho at _, 
288 P.3d at 839; State v. Hanson, 150 Idaho 729, 733, 249 P.3d 1184, 1188 (Ct. 
App. 2011). A DUI probationer's continued abuse of alcohol may be grounds for 
revocation of probation. Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733-34, 249 P.3d at 1188-89. 
Because it is undisputed that Allred violated multiple terms and conditions of 
probation, including continued abuse of alcohol, it was within the district court's 
discretion to revoke Allred's probation. 
Upon revocation a district may, within its discretion, reduce a sentence. 
Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 839; Hanson, 150 Idaho at 733, 249 P.3d 
at 1188. Review of the sentencing court's discretion after revocation of probation 
is conducted under the same legal standard applicable to claims that the 
sentence is excessive. State v. Pierce, 150 Idaho 1, 5, 244 P.3d 145, 149 
(2010). The record also shows no abuse of discretion in the sentence ultimately 
imposed. 
Allred committed his first DUI in 1980; the current conviction is his eighth 
for DUI and his third felony DUI conviction. (PSI, pp. 3-5.1) This was his eighth 
probationary period. (Id.) The district court specifically included as a special 
condition of probation a statement that, because of his prior probations, any 
violation of the terms of probation would be considered "fundamental" and would 
"result in the imposition of the underlying sentence." (R., p. 43.) Allred violated 
this probation by "drinking regularly" for at least three months, being in a bar, 
failing to pay his fines and fees, and absconding probation. (PSI, pp. 2, 5.) 
1 Citations to the pages of the PSI are to the electronic exhibit. 
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The district court considered the sentencing materials, including the 
various evaluations. (2/2/12 Tr., p. 7, L. 15 - p. 9, L. 2; p. 23, Ls. 20-23.) It 
considered the aggravation and mitigation and applied the legal factors of 
sentencing. (2/2/12 Tr., p. 23, L. 24 - p. 24, L. 3.) The district court concluded 
that Allred's "best shot" of controlling his addiction and leading a crime-free life 
was incarceration and the Therapeutic Community at the Department of 
Correction. (2/2/12 Tr., p. 24, Ls. 9-14.) With that in mind, the district court 
revoked probation and reduced the sentence to ten years with three and one-half 
years determinate. (2/2/12 Tr., p. 25, Ls. 1-24.) 
The record shows that Allred is a continuing threat to the safety of the 
community due to his thirty-year history of drinking and driving. No probationary 
program or alcohol treatment has had anything other than a short-term effect on 
this pattern of behavior. The district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking 
probation or by not further reducing Allred's sentence. 
Allred argues the district court abused its discretion when it revoked 
probation because Allred managed to be sober for "21-22 months" and led a 
"normal life" while on probation. (Appellant's brief, pp. 8-9.) Allred's time frame 
for sobriety is dubious. The district court placed Allred on probation on June 11, 
2009 (R., p. 39) and Allred, by his own admission, resumed regular drinking no 
later than August, 2010 (PSI, p. 2). This is a period of only 14 months. Allred 
bases his claim of 21-22 months by starting on the day of the instant offense. 
(Compare Appellant's brief (starting calculation in "October 2008") with R., p. 23 
( date of offense October 17, 2008).) That the majority of the time Allred spent 
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sober after his felony DUI he was in jail and then in prison on his rider supports 
the district court's actions. Likewise, 14 months of "normal life" weighs little in the 
face of a history of over thirty years of driving drunk. 
Allred next argues that his sentence is excessive because he has led a 
hard life and has a long history of alcohol abuse, at least in part explainable by 
mental health issues, and has expressed remorse. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-14.) 
The district court considered all of the reports and mitigating factors, however, 
and concluded that the best course was for Allred to seek rehabilitation while in 
the custody of the Department of Correction. (2/2/12 Tr., p. 7, L. 15 - p. 9, L. 2; 
p. 23, L. 20 - p. 24, L. 3; p. 24, Ls. 9-14; p. 25, Ls. 1-24.) Allred has failed to 
show that his sentence is excessive to that end. 
Allred has a long history of drinking and driving. He was unable to remain 
sober on probation. Neither the revocation of probation nor the sentence of ten 
years with three and one-half years fixed for felony driving under the influence 
were an abuse of discretion. 
A. 
11. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Did Not Deny Allred Due Process By Denying His 
Motion To Augment 
Introduction 
Allred argues that it violated due process, equal protection, and his right to 
counsel to deny his motion for augmentation with a transcript of the rider review 
hearing. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-17.) Because Allred has failed to establish 
that the transcript is even relevant, much less necessary for the appeal, Allred 
has failed to demonstrate any violation of his constitutional rights. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one 
of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free 
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the 
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App. 
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001). 
C. The Transcript Is Not Necessary To Complete A Record Sufficient For 
Appellate Review 
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on 
appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged 
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d 
472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v. 
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms 
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also 
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _, 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012).2 The 
state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide 
transcripts that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 372 
U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (indigent 
appellant has right to "a transcript of relevant trial proceedings"). Rather, an 
2 In Morgan, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that it generally lacked authority to 
find orders by the Idaho Supreme Court erroneous and rejected claims that 
augmentation with a transcript of a prior probation violation hearing was 
constitutionally required to challenge an order revoking probation entered for a 
subsequent probation violation. Morgan, 153 Idaho at_, 288 P.3d at 837-39. 
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indigent defendant is entitled, at state expense, to only those transcripts and 
portions of the record necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Griffin, 
351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372 U.S. 477. "[T]he State must afford [the indigent 
appellant] a record complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his 
claims." S.L.J., 519 U.S. at 121. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient, 
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his 
ability to pursue the appeal. See State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448 
P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438 
P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir. 
2002). 
This case is indistinguishable from State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 50 
P.3d 472 (2002). In that case the Idaho Supreme Court stated the relevant 
standards and concluded that the transcript of a hearing on a Rule 35 motion, in 
which there were no witnesses called, was not necessary to provide an adequate 
record for appellate review of the denial of that motion. kl at 462-63, 50 P.3d at 
477-78. Likewise, in this case there was no evidence presented at the rider 
review hearing.3 (R., pp. 36-37.) Also as in Strand, Allred was not entitled to the 
hearing he wants transcribed on appeal. State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 30 
P.3d 293 (2001); State v. Goodlett, 139 Idaho 262, 264, 77 P.3d 487, 489 (Ct. 
App. 2003) (it is "clear that the defendant need not be given a hearing ... before 
the sentencing court prior to a court's decision on relinquishment of jurisdiction"). 
3 The APSI was previously presented to the district court and is in the appellate 
record. (PSI, pp. 50-59.) 
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Because Allred was not entitled to a hearing before the district court decided 
whether to relinquish jurisdiction, and because no evidence not already in the 
record was presented at that hearing, Allred would not have been entitled to a 
transcript of the "rider review" hearing even had he timely appealed from the 
"rider review" ruling. That he is appealing from a different ruling made at a 
different and later hearing did not somehow vest him with a constitutional right to 
a transcript of the rider review hearing. 
The requested transcript is not constitutionally required because it is 
irrelevant to the appeal. Allred asserts "the requested transcript is relevant to the 
issues addressed at the probation revocation hearing" because his mental health 
and the possibility of mental health court were discussed at sentencing and the 
record does not currently show "whether that request [for mental health court] 
was restated .. . or whether Mr. Allred's mental health was discussed." 
(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-16.) Whether the parties "discussed" drug court or 
Allred's mental health at the rider review hearing does not make that transcript 
relevant. Certainly in Strand the parties discussed something relevant to the 
ultimate denial of the Rule 35 motion Strand challenged on appeal. Because a 
complete record of all discussions of relevant issues in a case is not required for 
adequate appellate review, Allred's argument fails. 
Allred has failed to establish that the transcript of the rider review hearing 
is necessary for appellate review. The transcript would not have been necessary 
for appellate review of the order that resulted from the rider review; it is much 
less important to the probation violation proceedings conducted months later. 
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Allred , has therefore established no due process, equal protection, or Sixth 
Amendment violations arising from the denial of augmentation with the irrelevant 
transcript. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's order 
revoking probation and executing the sentence of ten years with three and one-
half fixed for felony DUI. 
DATED this 18th day of January, 2013. 
\ 
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